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Long gone or fading fast are the days when only bookmakers, ponzi 
schemers, predatory mortgage brokers, and insider traders, just to name
a few, relied on paperwork to carry on their daily business.  The paperless 
world has come full circle.  Not even “respectable” lawbreakers can get
along without some electronic communication device or computer. 
Much to the chagrin of criminal lawyers who often lamented their
clients opening their big mouths to the cops, the criminal case has gone 
paperless.  Criminal lawyers now will be heard advising their clients not 
to put anything in e-mail or on the Internet unless they want the cops to 
read it. 
Additionally, the landscape of criminal defendants is changing rapidly. 
The CEOs of the large mortgage companies or financial firms do not see 
themselves hanging with common criminals; they make their deals at the
club or on the golf course. The problem is that the business following
such meetings is memorialized by electronic communication, and 
unknown to them, these business practices have caught the attention of
the government.  Welcome to twenty-first century communications. 
Modern-day communications, through e-mail, the web, instant messaging, 
electronic faxing, and digital voice mail, expand the nature and location
of “relevant evidence” as well as the obligations to obtain, preserve,
produce, and manage this evidence.1 There exists a rapidly emerging 
need for courts to uniformly recognize the increasing necessity for an
accused to access electronically stored information (ESI) in order to 
effectively build a defense in modern-day criminal prosecutions.
Furthermore, the context in which ESI was forensically ascertained may
be as important to a defendant as the substantive information recovered. 
Electronic Document Retention and Production, and an Advisory Board Member for the 
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.’s White Collar Crime Report. He is also a member of 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ (NACDL) White Collar Crime 
Committee, on which he is the Massachusetts District Chair for the NACDL’s Electronic 
Discovery Task Force, and is the Massachusetts State Chair for NACDL’s Membership 
Committee.  Mr. Gelb is a member of the Massachusetts Bar Association’s Implementation of
Technology Task Force, the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, the Massachusetts
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Criminal Law Section of the Boston 
Bar Association.  Mr. Gelb is a Louis D. Brandeis Fellow of the Massachusetts Bar 
Foundation and has been named a Rising Star in the 2009 edition of New England Super
Lawyers. Mr. Gelb is a frequent author and lecturer on electronic evidence and discovery, and 
civil and criminal trial practice and procedure, and is a coauthor of the book Massachusetts E-
Discovery and Evidence: Preservation Through Trial published by Massachusetts 
Continuing Legal Education, Inc.  The opinions and analyses contained herein are that of 
the author’s only and should not be interpreted as legal advice. In addition, the authors
would like to thank Richard L. Gillespie for his ongoing assistance in the production of
this Article.
 1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a); see also infra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
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This Article explores issues concerning electronic discovery (e-discovery),
its association with ESI, and how it impacts criminal litigation. 
Free e-mail accounts, such as Yahoo!, Gmail, and Hotmail and a 
competitive mobile communications market offering an affordable 
unification of services, such as e-mail, voice plans, and data on a single 
handheld device, expand the universe of evidence at issue—irrespective 
of whether the crime being prosecuted is “corporate” or “street” in nature.2 
The landscape of criminal defendants is also changing rapidly.
ESI evidence can significantly impact the outcome of a client’s civil
or criminal case.  However, e-discovery assumes a unique, critical role in
criminal proceedings.  Unlike hard copy documents and tangible evidence— 
guns, pictures, clothing, et cetera—ESI may contain exculpatory evidence
that may not be readily apparent to the prosecution who maintains
custody and control over the evidence.  Additionally, the prosecution 
may be improperly in possession of ESI that should be the subject of a 
motion to suppress, but the evidence may exculpate a defendant or affect
the strength of the prosecution’s case.3  Due to its dynamic nature, ESI 
has the potential to develop into Brady material.4 Because the
government’s obligations under Brady are not rooted in any particular 
constitutional right to discovery but rather in the due process protections 
that defendants are afforded in criminal proceedings, criminal lawyers 
must be on alert.5 
The greatest challenge may be ascertaining and obtaining electronic
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. The defense must
successfully convince the court that without “full and appropriate” 
pretrial disclosure and exchange of ESI, the defendant lacks the ability to 
mount a full and fair defense.6  Due process, as a general proposition, 
adapts to facts as they are presented in specific circumstances, and it is a 
2. The term corporate is historically used in reference to white collar crimes.
The term street is often used in reference to blue collar crimes.
 3. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
4. Brady material includes evidence in the custody and control of the prosecution
that would either exculpate the accused or undermine the strength of the prosecution’s
case. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (holding that suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence requested by the defendant that exculpates a defendant is a 
violation of due process). 
5. See id. at 90–91; see also 2  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 256, at 157–58 (2009) (citing United States v.
Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
6. See 2 WRIGHT & HENNING, supra note 5, § 256, at 155–58. 
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progressive principle that has been applied to mediums containing ESI, 
such as search warrants of computers and testimonial evidence residing 
on audiotapes.7  A defendant’s rights must be expanded to accommodate 
contemporary applications.8  Criminal ESI discoverability should be 
governed by the same due process analysis that courts have recognized 
for other areas of discovery.9  The obligation to make relevant evidence 
available to the accused or to suppress its use when improperly obtained 
should be aggressively protected.  Criminal defendants require reasonable
access to ESI evidence so that their counsel may capably advocate for
the protection of their Fourth,10 Fifth,11 and Sixth Amendment rights.12 
ESI evidence gives rise to financial concerns: the vast majority of
criminal defendants are indigent13 and thus without funds to pay for 
costly e-discovery.  The counsel for such defendants could look to the 
state and judicial systems for required funding, but the expense and
burdensomeness of e-discovery should be balanced against the
government’s needs and the defendant’s rights.14  Lawyers should be 
prepared to explain and judges should be aware of the problems and
expenses potentially associated with ESI, so they do not “accidentally”
7. See, e.g., United States v. Laine, 270 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that 
a defendant’s consent to forensically search a computer suspected of containing
child pornography did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures). 
8. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting), 
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967). In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis observed:
We have . . . held that general limitations on the powers of government, like 
those embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
do not forbid the United States or the States from meeting modern conditions 
by regulations which “a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would 
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.”  Clauses guaranteeing to the
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity
of adaptation to a changing world. 
Id. (citations omitted).
9.  See Higgs, 713 F.2d at 42. 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (stating that a 
magistrate shall issue a warrant identifying the property to be seized and naming
or describing the person or place to be searched).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
13. See  CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000); STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 (1996).
14. See HARLOW, supra note 13. 
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issue a general discovery order that could be overly broad, making 
discovery burdensome and costly.15 
Over the past decade, courts have attempted to keep e-discovery in
pace with technological advances. In McPeek v. Ashcroft, the court used 
a “marginal utility” approach to craft an order for discovery of e-mails 
that might have contained relevant information and required the 
producing party to pay the costs but also to keep an accounting.16  The 
parties and the court could then determine if the information gathered in 
light of the costs justified further discovery.17 
In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., the party
charged with production of e-mail stored on backup disks requested that 
the court to issue a protective order precluding such discovery due to
costs.18  The court found no justification for a protective order but did
create and apply a protocol for cost shifting.19 
Rowe was further addressed in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC when
the plaintiff requested e-mails from defendant’s archival media, and the 
defendant, citing Rowe, claimed undue burden and expense and urged
the court to shift the cost of production to the plaintiff.20  The court 
refrained from applying Rowe in a strict manner and noted that Rowe
might result in a disproportionate shifting of costs away from large
defendants.21 The court ultimately issued a modified approach by
ordering a partial discovery of the e-mails––the plaintiff selected the e-
15. See Daniel B. Garrie & Maureen Duffy-Lewis, E-Discovery: Federal Rules 
Versus California Rules—The Devil Is in the Details, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 218 
(2009).
16.  McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32–35 (D.D.C. 2001). 
17. Id. at 34–35. 
18. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
19. Id. at 433. 
20. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
21. Id. at 317.  In addition, the court stated the test to be used:
[I]n conducting the cost-shifting analysis, the following factors should be
considered, weighted more-or-less in the following order: (1) [t]he extent to which 
the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information; (2) [t]he
availability of such information from other sources; (3) [t]he total cost of production,
compared to the amount in controversy; (4) [t]he total cost of production, compared 
to the resources available to each party; (5) [t]he relative ability of each party to
control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) [t]he importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation; and (7) [t]he relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.
Id. at 324. 
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mails and the partial discovery was at the defendant’s expense.22  Then 
the parties were instructed to evaluate the search results to determine if
further searching and expense was warranted.23 
Coordinating policies and procedures with technology is important 
today, not only for prosecutorial agencies but also for corporate America. 
In the recent past, corporations have been ordered to preserve and
produce, sometimes at considerable expense, computerized information, 
including e-mail messages, support systems, software, voice mail systems, 
computer storage media, backup tapes, and telephone records.24  On  
December 1, 2006, the federal courts responded to the growing demands 
and complexities of e-discovery by amending Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 to address such discovery.25 
Many states, including California, have begun to do the same, but as 
expected, the lack of resources still leaves criminal defendants and
corporate businesses in a difficult predicament.26 
The amended FRCP Rule 34(a) defines ESI as “other data or data 
compilations . . . stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the
responding party into a reasonably usable form.”27  Courts have applied 
the amended rules by requiring parties to a case, whether corporate or 
individual, to preserve,28 identify,29 disclose,30 and produce,31 on pain of
22. Id.
 23. Id.
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34; Peter Brown, Developing Corporate Internet, Intranet
and E-Mail Policies, in SECOND ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 1998, at 364 (PLI
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 520, 
1998), WL 520 PLI/Pat 347 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust 
Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995)).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45; see Garrie & Duffy-Lewis, supra note 15.
 26. See Posting by G. Krabacher to eDiscoTECH Blog, http://www.bricker.com/legal
services/practice/litigation/ediscotech/eblog/details.aspx?id=217#page=1 (July 20, 2009). 
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
28. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 140– 
42 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (imposing attorneys’ fees, costs, and adverse inference sanctions for
defendants’ failure to preserve usage data and digital music files from its servers); Fox v. 
Riverdeep, Inc., No. 07-13622, 2008 WL 5244297, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2008) 
(noting that if defendants failed to preserve evidence, including e-mails, once they received 
cease and desist letter, an instruction to the jury that it could presume missing documents 
were unfavorable to defendants was appropriate).
29. See, e.g., Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 
614, 637 (D. Colo. 2007) (imposing monetary sanctions and requiring defendants to bear 
the cost of a second review of its computer files and website for relevant ESI). 
30. See, e.g., Amersham Biosciences Corp. v. PerkinElmer, Inc., No. 03-4901, 
2007 WL 329290, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2007). 
31. See, e.g., In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 183–202 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (imposing adverse inference spoliation sanction in securities fraud action because 
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monetary and other sanctions, relevant information residing in any 
electronic device.32  What happens when relevant evidence suffers digital 
spoliation? 
FRCP Rule 37(e) provides a limited safe harbor from sanctions when
the loss of ESI occurs as a result of the “routine, good-faith operation of 
an electronic information system.”33  Litigants must demonstrate that
they took reasonable steps to preserve in “good faith” evidence they
knew or should have known to be relevant to reasonably anticipated or
commenced litigation.34  Therefore, a party cannot evade the safe harbor
provision by setting ESI to self-destruct.35 The amended FRCP addresses 
digital spoliation by recognizing that it can occur in various ways and 
will result in varying penalties depending on the facts and legal context
in which the claim arises.36  What recourse is available to a defendant 
whose rights are violated by the prosecution’s conduct contravening the 
safe harbor rules?  A criminal defendant’s liberty is at stake; spoliation 
of evidence could result in a dismissal of the criminal case.37 
Criminal lawyers beware: the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do 
not afford criminal defendants an established right to access ESI beyond 
the scope of rules 1638 or 17.39  The accused should argue that the spirit
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides criminal defendants 
with a constitutional right to access ESI in the possession, custody, or 
control of the prosecution as third parties.40 
defendant corporation had the practical ability to obtain documents it needed from a 
nonparty corporation and defendant corporation’s failure to preserve e-mails relevant to 
plaintiffs’ claims was grossly negligent). 
32. See id. at 201. 
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
34. Id.
 35. See id.
 36. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 502003 
CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005), rev’d on other 
grounds, 955 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). A general definition of spoliation is
“the act of injuring esp[ecially] beyond reclaim.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1206 (11th ed. 2003).
 37. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn. 1999) (noting in dicta that a
trial court could dismiss a case if the missing evidence would result in a fundamentally
unfair trial).
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 is applicable for evidence in the custody of the government. 
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 is applicable for evidence in the possession of third parties. 
40. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (holding that suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence requested by the defendant that exculpates a defendant is 
a violation of due process). 
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Generally, a criminal defendant is entitled to a rather limited discovery,
with no general right to obtain the statements of the government’s 
witnesses before they have testified.41  Additionally, it is not unreasonable
to assume this principle would apply to items such as e-mail, text 
messages, and other forms of ESI.  This does not seem just when in civil 
litigation, by contrast, a party is entitled, as a general matter, to discovery of
any information sought if it is relevant and “reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”42 
A critical concern is the imbalance of discovery rights between civil 
and criminal law.  Criminal defendants are potentially at risk of being 
denied access to exculpatory, mitigating, or impeachment evidence that
may be legitimate Brady material.43  The often overwhelming and 
daunting task of mounting a full and complete defense to a prosecutor’s
charges can result in a defendant pleading to criminal charges before e-
discovery is completed.  Moreover, criminal defendants’ access to ESI 
varies from court to court on both the state and federal levels because of 
the lack of uniform rules governing e-discovery.44 
Many cases pursued by prosecutors are investigated in tandem with 
other governmental agencies—within the parameters of laws governing
parallel proceedings—including Congress, which may be investigating 
potential civil or regulatory violations of federal laws.45  Absent 
common procedures among forums for the handling of ESI, defendants 
face a risk when they produce ESI to the government in noncriminal
41. See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 825 (1996), superseded by statute, 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 28 U.S.C. 2466(a) (2006). 
42. See, e.g., id. at 825–26 (comparing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) and 26.2 with
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).  For exceptions regarding witness statements not subject to
disclosure under FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), see 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006).  See generally
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (regarding witness statements made when an organizational defendant is
involved). 
43. See generally Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88 (categorizing Brady material as exculpatory 
evidence either absolving—or at the very least mitigating—a defendant’s criminal liability or
in the alternative, as evidence that tends to undercut the government’s case, such as 
impeachment evidence).
44. For example, access to ESI evidence is likely to vary in the context of evidence
maintained by the government when investigating and prosecuting offenses derived from 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901. The Walsh
Act established, among other things, a national database incorporating the use of DNA
evidence collection in addition to a DNA registry that tracks convicted sex offenders with
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. Id. §§ 16914(b), 16919(a), 16981(a).  Because 
laws of this nature are particularly important, the Adam Walsh Act is provided as an example
of a context in which a defendant’s access to the government’s electronic database could
be outcome determinative for the defendant. 
45. Examples of such parallel investigations include, but are not limited to, actions
based on securities law, healthcare regulations, and intellectual property guidelines.
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proceedings. Such a risk exists when people produce ESI without knowing 
whether they are targets or witnesses in criminal actions.  Defendants 
have a constitutional right to know exactly the nature and cause of the 
government’s case,46 and when applied to the twenty-first century, that
right should include the production—or at the very least the inspection— 
of ESI. Therefore, defense counsel must be familiar with ESI that is not 
apparent on the face of a document in electronic form, such as
“metadata,” which is data about data.
Most targets of a criminal investigation are not privy to information 
from intergovernmental agency efforts, such as the government’s motive 
in issuing administrative subpoenas when a target is unaware of a 
parallel proceeding. In United States v. Kordel, the United States
Supreme Court made it clear that parallel investigations conducted by 
civil and criminal enforcement agencies must meet the requirements of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.47 Kordel involved a corporate 
vice president who answered the government’s interrogatories during a 
civil proceeding reproving allegedly misbranded products.48  Had the 
defendant been more informed, he could have invoked his privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination.49  Failing to do so, he was not
able to assert that he was compelled to give testimony against himself as 
ground for overturning a conviction for introducing misbranded drugs 
into interstate commerce, even if the information supplied in answers 
provided evidence or leads useful to the government in the criminal 
prosecution.50  The Court did find that “[i]t would stultify enforcement 
of federal law” to limit the government’s discretion to conduct dual
investigations strategically; the Court suggested that a defendant may be
entitled to a remedy when “the [g]overnment has brought a civil action 
solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution.”51 
Corporate entities are creatures of the state and do not enjoy a Fifth 
Amendment privilege; however, their employees as individuals do, and 
counsel must be on alert as to whether a defendant has an “act of 
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th
Cir. 1990). 
47.  United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1970). 
48.  Id. at 2, 5, 6. 
49. Id. at 7–8. 
50. Id. at 7–10. 
51. Id. at 11–12. 
 529
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production” privilege.52 Kordel and Doe remain good benchmarks for
present-day defendants confronting governmental agencies seeking e-
discovery.  Defendants should inquire, with the advice of their counsel, 
whether the forum the government or regulator is utilizing to obtain e-
discovery is appropriate and whether the parties have a common
understanding as to the implication of production.  Defendants must be
wary as to whether the e-discovery sought in one forum, such as a 
regulatory or administrative forum, is a pretext for building a criminal 
prosecution that compromises a defendant’s constitutional rights.53 
Moreover, the protocol for handling ESI and the manner in which it is 
actually handled should be memorialized in the event that contested 
issues arise.
Because technology has become inextricably tied to the way people
communicate and therefore constitutes important evidence, criminal 
defendants will likely seek discovery of ESI, such as Facebook, 
YouTube, Twitter, and any other soon-to-be social networks, from third
parties as well as the government. Counsel who does not press the 
government effectively to produce ESI may deprive the client of an 
adequate defense. Counsel should also investigate all sources that may
be available to clients for underwriting the expense of e-discovery, such 
as the advancement provisions of the directors’ and officers’ insurance
policies. 
As the role of ESI becomes ever more central during pre- and post-
indictment proceedings, criminal defendants may need to rely on the 
resources of friends and relatives in order to retain computer forensic 
experts in addition to counsel.  As for indigent clients, defense attorneys 
may have to petition for court-ordered funds.  ESI may contain golden 
nuggets of information, and therefore, defendants who do not diligently
pursue ESI on a level playing field with the prosecution may place their
defense at risk. 
E-discovery is fertile ground for motions to suppress, but its dynamics 
can be fragile, so be aware that its mishandling may unlawfully interfere 
with a defense. Targets of criminal prosecutions should ascertain
whether the government obtained evidence pursuant to a valid search
warrant,54 especially when the government seizes ESI based on an 
52. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984) (holding that contents of 
business records were not privileged, but the “act of producing” records was testimonial
in nature and therefore privileged and could not be compelled by the government without 
a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003). 
53. See, e.g., Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11–12. 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
530
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affidavit that did not appropriately—or truthfully—describe the places to
be searched and items to be seized from an information system.55 
Fourth Amendment questions that have been plaguing American 
courts for decades have resurfaced with the development of technology 
and the emergence of e-discovery.  Specifically, arguments have been
made to claim that the Fourth Amendment should not apply because 
electronically shared or stored information does not possess a “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”56 Another Fourth Amendment concern that has 
lost some clarity with e-discovery and has garnered recent criticism in
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc.57 is the prohibition against general warrants and the need
for particularity of description for the issuance of all warrants.58  E-
discovery allows for the search of a suspect’s computers and other 
electronic devices that could hold incriminating information, including 
hard drives, systems, databases, and e-mails.  Additionally, an officer’s
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. 
55. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978) (noting that “the affidavit’s 
false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish 
probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded 
to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit”).
56. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (noting when there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy, the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not 
apply); see also Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (establishing
precedent that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails through a company 
server or on a company computer—including laptops—if a workplace manual gives such
warning, even if the defendant does not know of the warning); United States v. Simons, 
206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that employees do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for electronic communications at work).
57. 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn and superseded by 513 F.3d 1085 
(9th Cir. 2008), aff’d en banc, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009).  This case has garnered national 
attention because of its connection with professional baseball.  See id.  However, it has 
attracted scrutiny because of its argument for the expansion of the government’s 
authority to access private individual’s digital information without a warrant.  Id. at 939– 
40; see Aaron Seiji Lowenstein, Search and Seizure on Steroids: United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing and Its Consequences for Private Information Stored on
Commercial Electronic Databases (May 2007) (unpublished article, on file with author), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/aaron_lowenstein/1/. 
58. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (stating that warrants must 
“particularly [describe] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”).
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searches are not limited by the size of evidence59 or “curtilage” when 
dealing with e-discovery, as they would be in traditional searches.60 
These types of unencumbered searches seem to further weaken the 
notion of people being “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”61 which the Fourth 
Amendment requires.62 
The rapidly growing role of ESI in criminal prosecutions of all types,
including the prosecution of the mortgage broker and lowly bookmaker,
is obvious.  It requires that counsel be conversant with this type of 
evidence and understand how it could affect criminal proceedings. 
Otherwise, a criminal defendant may be deprived of effective assistance
of counsel,63 and who wants to be that lawyer?  In civil proceedings, ESI 
is a cost issue, but in criminal proceedings, failure to obtain ESI may
result in the client’s loss of liberty.  Technology governs the way members 
of society communicate, and the criminal justice system must adjust 
itself to the realities of twenty-first century discovery and ESI’s role in
order to ensure everyone gets a fair shake at trial. 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing
Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting “[t]he search must
be one directed in good faith toward the objects specified in the warrant or for other
means and instrumentalities by which the crime charged had been committed”).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (defining curtilage
as the enclosed area of land around a dwelling that can be protected against unreasonable 
searches by the Fourth Amendment).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
62. Id.
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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